China eases up on the U.S. for REE exports — Europe still pays for delays

Crisis background: China uses REE as a trade weapon

China controls 90–95% of global REE production (neodymium, dysprosium, terbium) and 90% of NdFeB magnets — the strongest permanent magnets in the world, essential for EV motors, wind turbines, defense systems (F-35, Leopard), and home appliances. In April 2025, Beijing introduced Announcement No. 18 — export licenses for seven key REE and NdFeB — in retaliation for U.S. tariffs (47% on Chinese EVs) and EU measures (additional duties on batteries and panels). In October, No. 61 extended this to technologies and products with trace amounts of REE.
Global effects:

• Neodymium prices: +10–20%
• Dysprosium: +20% (up to USD 204/kg)
• Delivery delays: 20–45 days for a license
• EU imports: down 90% y/y

Europe, importing 98–99% of NdFeB from China, had no stockpiles. The U.S.? It reacted faster — Trump had already pledged in the 2024 campaign to “cut China off from the American market unless they make a deal.”

Seoul summit: the U.S. forces a pause — China relents

30–31 October 2025: Trump and Xi meet in South Korea. The outcome?

• One-year pause on No. 61 — new restrictions deferred until November 2026
• Stabilized NdFeB exports to the U.S. — no extra checks
• China to buy USD 24bn of soy and Alaskan gas
• Block on fentanyl precursors

Trump on X: “Best deal ever. China pays, America controls supply chains.”
Neodymium prices fell by 5–7% in 24h — to ~USD 190/kg.
Why did Xi yield?

• 47% tariff pressure on Chinese EVs and tech
• Strengthening Taiwan (the U.S. sold USD 2bn in weapons)
• Soy and energy — China needs stability before winter

This isn’t Trump’s first win — in 2018–2019, the Phase 1 trade deal also forced purchases. Now the U.S. is building alternatives: Lynas (Australia), MP Materials (California), Hitachi (Japan).

Europe? Acting like a brake, not an engine

The EU has been negotiating since April — with no breakthrough.

• June 2025: Šefčovič–Wang — “alarming disruptions.” Result? Only a fast-track for VW and Renault
• July–August: Licenses for four Chinese producers (Zhongke Sanhuan, Baotou Tianhe) — but case-by-case
• October: EP resolution — “coercion!” Zero effect
• 26 October: Von der Leyen launches RESourceEU — EUR 50bn for recycling and mines (Sweden 2027+)

Why is the EU losing?

Germany (40% of EU GDP) exports EUR 200bn to China — it doesn’t want escalation. That’s why the ACI (Anti-Coercion Instrument) sits in a drawer.

Impact on Poland: importers pay for the EU’s weakness

Poland imports 98% of NdFeB from China (customs code 8505199089).

• DHIT Sp. z o.o. (dhit.pl): “45-day delays, prices +15–30% from December”
• Xinxin Polska: New B2C orders suspended
• VW Poznań, Stellantis Tychy: EV line stoppages
• PGE, Orlen: Offshore wind farm delays
• PGZ: Risk to Leopard drive systems

Without a U.S.-style pause — Q1 2026: +30–60% NdFeB prices.
Polish experts (PAIH): “The EU can’t play hardball. Trump shows how to win.”

What is China doing? Playing divide et impera

– USA: pause + purchases
– EU: licenses only for the “trusted” (e.g., VW via Baotou)
– Rest of the world: queue at MOFCOM

A Chinese delegation arrives in Brussels on 4–5 November — perhaps a “green corridor” for Siemens and Airbus. But without pressure — zero effect.

Reaction on X: the U.S. celebrates, the EU stays silent

- [post:21]: “Trump deal = prices down. Europe? Begs for licenses.”
- [post:25]: “America gets richer, the EU goes bankrupt on NdFeB.”
Hashtags: #TrumpDeals #ChinaREE #EuropeFail

Recommendations for Polish companies — don’t wait for Brussels

1. Stockpiles: 3–6 months (N42/N52 — cheaper licenses)
2. Diversification:
     - Japan (Hitachi) — +50% prices, but stable
     - Canada (Nunavut) — via CRMA
     - Recycling (BMW testing REE-free)
3. Compliance: ISZTAR/TARIC, CE/RoHS
4. Support: Ministry of Development, PAIH — grants for buffers
5. Monitor: MOFCOM, EU–China summit (15–16 November)

Conclusion: time for a Polish strategy — with the U.S., not the EU

30 October 2025 showed that China relents to the strong, not the weak. The U.S. gained time to diversify. Europe? Still pays for naivety. Poland can’t wait — build stockpiles, seek alternatives, lobby for bilateral deals with the U.S. Because in the NdFeB game, power, not dialogue, is what counts.